The purpose of the recently proposed p rep statistic is to estimate the probability of concurrence, that is, the probability that a replicate experiment yields an effect of the same sign (Killeen, 2005a) . The influential journal Psychological Science endorses p rep and recommends its use over that of traditional methods. Here we show that p rep overestimates the probability of concurrence. This is because p rep was derived under the assumption that all effect sizes in the population are equally likely a priori. In many situations, however, it is advisable to also entertain a null hypothesis of no or approximately no effect. We show how the posterior probability of the null hypothesis is sensitive to a priori considerations and to the evidence provided by the data; and the higher the posterior probability of the null hypothesis, the smaller the probability of concurrence. When the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are equally likely a priori, p rep may overestimate the probability of concurrence by 30% and more. We conclude that p rep provides an upper bound on the probability of concurrence, a bound that brings with it the danger of having researchers believe that their experimental effects are much more reliable than they actually are.
Suppose you conduct an experiment to test whether words such as pizza prime words such as coin (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998) . The motivating hypothesis states that prior presentation of a word facilitates later processing for another word when both words refer to objects with similar physical attributes (e.g., pizzas and coins are both round and flat). This relatively little studied "perceptual priming" effect may be contrasted with the well-established "associative priming" effect in which the presentation of a word such as butter facilitates later processing for the associatively related word bread (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) .
In your priming experiment, you measure the effects of perceptual priming and associative priming, and a p-value hypothesis test shows that both effects are significant-by coincidence, both tests yield p = .03. Blissfully unaware of the work by Pecher et al. (1998) , you set out to submit a report to one of psychology's premier journals, Psychological Science. You browse the journal's Author Guidelines and find that authors are encouraged to replace the traditional p value with Peter Killeen's p rep value (Ashby & O'Brien, 2008; Killeen, 2005 Killeen, , 2005a Killeen, , 2005b Killeen, , 2006 Killeen, , 2007 Sanabria & Killeen, 2007;  for discussion see Cumming, 2005; Doros & Geier, 2005; Macdonald, 2005; .
Because you do not want to decrease needlessly your chances of getting accepted by Psychological Science, you transform your two-sided p-values of p = .03 into p rep values of approximately .94 (e.g., Killeen, 2005, p. 17; Killeen, 2005a, p. 353) . You do not have the time to analyze the statistics in the Killeen articles carefully, but you understand that you can conclude that, should you repeat the experiment, there is a p rep ≈ .94 probability of again finding each priming effect, even though the replication may not be statistically significant (i.e., replication refers to concurrence, that is, finding a replicate effect of the same sign; Killeen, 2005a, p. 346) . Is this conclusion justified? We believe it is not.
Our disbelief stems from the fact that p rep is based on a single model, namely the model that assumes all effect sizes to be equally likely a priori (Doros & Geier, 2005; Killeen, 2005b) . We call this model H 1 . The p rep statistic does not take into account the plausibility of the simpler model, H 0 , that postulates that an effect is either completely absent or so small that it would take a much larger sample for it to be detected. When H 0 is deemed plausible-either through a priori considerations or through the information provided by the data-this should considerably reduce one's confidence of finding concurrence, as p rep ≈ 1/2 under H 0 (see also Macdonald, 2005) . 1 To illustrate the impact of a priori considerations on the probability of concurrence, let us revisit the priming experiment and its p rep ≈ .94 for the established phenomenon of associative priming and the new phenomenon of perceptual priming. Imagine that you are given $100 to bet that a replicate effect will concur with your data; that is, you get to keep the $100 when the effect of your choice (i.e., either perceptual priming or associative priming) replicates, but you lose the $100 that you were given when the effect of your choice does not replicate. In our priming example, the p rep statistic suggests that you have no grounds to prefer one effect over the other, as p rep ≈ .94 for both. Nevertheless, the smart money in the betting scenario will be on the established effect, not on the new effect.
The reason for this is the very real possibility that your new finding of perceptual priming is a fluke, that is, a Type I error-and if this is the case, then p rep is 1/2, not .94. On the other hand, associative priming has been reported in countless studies since Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) , and this knowledge increases the probability that your measurement of this effect is real, which in turn increases the probability of finding concurrence in a replication of your priming experiment.
Thus, it is evident that established but not novel effects inspire high confidence of concurrence. This observation is, however, at odds with the standard interpretation of the p rep statistic (see also Macdonald, 2005) ; in the following, we elaborate and formalize this intuitive argument and show how the calculation of the probability of concurrence requires one to take both H 0 and H 1 into account simultaneously.
The p rep Statistic
Consider an experiment that features two conditions. Let d denote the observed effect size, and d rep the effect size in a replication study. Concurrence is observed when d and d rep have the same sign, so that d rep d ≥ 0. As explained in Doros and Geier (2005) and Killeen (2005a Killeen ( , 2005b , p rep is computed under the assumption of a flat improper prior distribution 2 on the true population effect δ. This assumption is H 1 in our terminology. To be explicit,
Note that this equation does not feature δ; that unobserved parameter has been integrated out using the flat improper prior distribution. Of course, one could argue whether such a flat distribution on δ is appropriate (Iverson, Lee, Zhang, & Wagenmakers, in press a; Iverson, Lee, & Wagenmakers, in press b) : indeed, in Bayesian statistics, it is standard practice to use prior distributions that put more mass on small effect sizes than on large effect sizes. 3 For instance, the prior on effect size in the Zellner and Siow (1980) Bayesian hypothesis test is the Cauchy distribution (i.e., a t-distribution with one degree of freedom). Here we sidestep this discussion and wish to point out only that p rep has Bayesian roots, and can therefore be given a Bayesian interpretation: p rep estimates the probability that a replicate effect will concur with an original, under the assumption of a flat prior on the true population effect δ. More details are given in Appendix A.
The statistic p rep can also be given a frequentist interpretation. Specifically, p rep relates to the traditional two-sided p-value as (Killeen, 2005, p. 17) :
where Φ denotes the standard Normal cumulative distribution function. Figure 1 plots the relation between p rep and the two-sided p-value. As can be seen from the figure, the relation between the two statistics is close to linear, both for p ∈ (0, 0.5) (left panel) and for p ∈ (0, 0.1) (right panel). Divergence from linearity is only apparent when we consider p-values that are very small. Figure 1 . The function that relates p rep to the two-sided p-value (Killeen, 2005, p. 17) .
Given the almost linear mapping between the two-sided p-value and p rep , one might well wonder to what extent p rep provides information that the traditional p-value does not. Doros and Geier (2005, p. 1006) argued that "(...) any measure that is no more than a simple transformation of the classical p value (...) will inherit the shortcomings of that p value." In response, Killeen (2005b Killeen ( , p. 1011 argued that p rep and the p-value, "although informationally equivalent, are distinguished by the inferences they warrant; p rep is a valid posterior predictive probability, p is not."
Bayesian Model Averaging and its Effect on p rep
As we have seen above, the statistic p rep calculates the probability of concurrence under H 1 , that is, under the assumption of a flat prior distribution for the population effect size δ. We propose to also consider an alternative model, H 0 , that states that δ ≈ 0. Under H 0 , the value of p rep is Pr (d rep d ≥ 0|d, H 0 ) ≈ 1/2. We will later discuss the extent to which H 0 is plausible, but for now we proceed by noting that in standard statistical practice, be it Bayesian, frequentist, or likelihood-based, H 0 is generally considered plausible and may even be assigned special status.
Thus, we now have two estimates for the probability of concurrence, one under H 1 and one under H 0 . How might we proceed? One way would be to settle on the estimate provided by the most likely model. However, this would mean that a small change in the data-say a minimal change that switches our preference from H 1 to H 0 -could lead to a dramatic change in p rep . More generally, a procedure that focuses on the estimates from a single model ignores the uncertainty in model selection, and therefore results in "(...) overconfident inferences and decisions that are more risky than one thinks they are" (Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, & Volinsky, 1999, p. 382) .
A second, better way to proceed is to construct a single estimate for the probability of concurrence, one that does not depend on the model that is being entertained. To this end, one can calculate a weighted average of the two p rep 's, in which the weights are given by the posterior probabilities of H 1 and H 0 . This procedure is commonly known as Bayesian model averaging (e.g., Draper, 1995; Hoeting et al., 1999; Madigan & Raftery, 1994) . Note that a small change in the data causes only a small change in the posterior model probabilities, so that, even though the preference order for the models may switch, the change in the model averaged estimate of p rep will be small.
This means that when we apply the Bayesian model averaging procedure to p rep , we should find that the weighted average of p rep values yields a more realistic estimate of the probability of concurrence, an estimate that dampens the enthusiasm brought about by an analysis that only considers H 1 . Specifically, the model averaged value for p rep , denoted here by p Bma rep is always smaller or equal to that of the original p rep which is conditional on
The foregoing shows that, from a Bayesian perspective at least, it is prudent to calculate the overall probability of concurrence as a weighted average of the separate probabilities of concurrence under H 0 and H 1 . Note that in order to arrive at an estimate for the weights-the posterior model probabilities-one needs to update the prior model probabilities Pr(H 0 ) and Pr(H 1 ) by means of the data f (D|H 0 ) and f (D|H 1 ) to posterior model probabilities Pr(H 0 |D) and Pr(H 1 |D), respectively. This implies that p Bma rep will be lower than p rep to the extent that Pr(H 0 |D) is large. This in turn occurs when prior considerations lead to a high value for the prior model probability Pr(H 0 ), or when the data are relatively likely under H 0 , that is, when f (D|H 0 ) is relatively large compared to f (D|H 1 ).
The above analysis also clarifies why, in our earlier priming example, one would have more confidence in replication of the well-established effect than in that of the new effect; for the new effect, Pr(H 0 ) is relatively large, and this leads p Bma rep to be relatively small. To get a feeling for the extent to which model averaging drives down estimates for the probability of concurrence, we now turn to an example from a default Bayesian hypothesis test.
Illustration: Model Averaging for A Default Bayesian Hypothesis Test
Before presenting the results from the Bayesian hypothesis test, it is important to introduce some key concepts of Bayesian inference. More information can be found in Bayesian articles and books that discuss philosophical foundations (Lindley, 2000; O'Hagan & Forster, 2004) , computational innovations (Gamerman & Lopes, 2006) , and practical contributions (Congdon, 2003) .
Assume you contemplate two models, H 0 and H 1 , and seek to quantify model uncertainty in terms of probability. Consider first H 0 . Bayes' rule dictates how your prior probability of H 0 , Pr(H 0 ), is updated through the observed data D to give the posterior probability of H 0 , Pr(H 0 |D):
In the same way, one can calculate the posterior probability of H 1 , Pr(H 1 |D). The ratio of these posterior probabilities is given by
This equation shows that the change from prior odds Pr(H 0 )/ Pr(H 1 ) to posterior odds Pr(H 0 |D)/ Pr(H 1 |D) is determined entirely by the ratio of the marginal likelihoods
This ratio is generally known as the Bayes factor (Jeffreys, 1961) , and the Bayes factor, or the log of it, is often interpreted as the weight of evidence coming from the data (Good, 1985) . A hypothesis test based on the Bayes factor prefers the model under which the observed data are most likely (for details see Berger & Pericchi, 1996; Bernardo & Smith, 1994, Chapter 6; Gill, 2002, Chapter 7; Klugkist, Laudy, & Hoijtink, 2005; Kass & Raftery, 1995; O'Hagan, 1995) . Note that the Bayes factor quantifies the evidence for H 0 versus H 1 without taking into account the prior plausibility of the models.
Having established the necessary terminology, we can now discuss the effect of model averaging on p rep using a Bayesian Z-test that was proposed by Smith and Spiegelhalter (1980) . This Bayesian Z-test is fully automatic, and, as far as automatic hypothesis tests go, its performance is regarded as "quite satisfactory" (Berger & Delampady, 1987, p. 319) . The Smith and Spiegelhalter Z-test estimates the Bayes factor by means of the following equation:
where Z = d n/2 is the familiar frequentist test statistic. From Equation 3 and the derivations in Appendix A, the model averaged probability of concurrence is given by
where Φ again denotes the standard Normal cumulative distribution function. 746. It is striking that .746, the model averaged probability of concurrence, is considerably more conservative than the .919 value that is obtained when H 0 is ignored (i.e., on a scale from .5 to 1, this amounts to a decrease of 34.6%).
To demonstrate more fully the effect of model averaging on the estimated probability of concurrence, Figure 2 shows three different p rep methods as a function of Z-score. In each panel of Figure 2, Zellner and Siow (1980) , yield similar results. The dashed line corresponds to an H 1 that is a priori just as likely as H 0 (i.e., Pr(H 1 ) = Pr(H 0 ) = 0.5); the dotted line corresponds to an H 1 that is a priori less likely than H 0 (i.e., Pr(H 1 ) = 0.1, Pr(H 0 ) = 0.9).
Each panel from Figure 2 shows that Killeen's p rep considerably overestimates the model-averaged p Bma rep . The extent of overestimation increases with n. Figure 2 highlights two causes that lead Killeen's p rep to overestimate the probability of concurrence. First, the difference between the solid and the dashed lines indicates the extent to which the data support H 0 . When f (D|H 0 ) is non-negligible compared to f (D|H 1 ), the non-negligible posterior probability for H 0 drives down p Bma rep compared to p rep . Second, the difference between the dashed and the dotted lines indicates the additional effect of prior plausibilitywhen H 1 is unlikely a priori, the probability of concurrence is low, especially for data that are inconclusive.
At this point, it is important to address two objections that might be raised against our analysis. The first objection holds that Pr(H 0 ) = 0, because the null hypothesis is supposedly never true exactly. At first sight, this objection-should it be correct-appears to seriously undercut our analysis. The second objection holds that prior probabilities for models and parameters can never be known, and can therefore be safely ignored.
Objection 1: Is the Null Hypothesis Ever Exactly True?
The first objection to our analysis goes as follows (e.g., Cohen, 1994) . We know that, when we compare two populations, the difference between them will never be exactly zero. This means that we should be able to demonstrate the existence of any effect whatsoever, given only that the sample size is large enough. For a frequentist hypothesis test, the argument states that for large n, we are guaranteed to reject the null hypothesis. But if we know beforehand that the null hypothesis should be rejected for large n, then why would we be interested in showing that it can or cannot be rejected for small n? For a Bayesian hypothesis test, the same argument could be used to claim that we know a priori that Pr(H 0 ) = 0, as δ = 0 always; and if this claim is true, Equation 3 simplifies to p Bma rep = p rep , and the overestimation of p rep is illusory.
The first counter-argument to this claim is that our results hold regardless of whether the null hypothesis is true exactly or only approximately. Specifically, the same qualitative pattern of results is obtained when we define the null hypothesis as a distribution of small effect sizes that is centered around zero. For mathematical details we refer the reader to Appendix B and to the work by Berger and Delampady (1987, pp. 321-322) .
Intuitively, the idea is that if the null hypothesis is only true approximately, so that a very small effect is present-albeit one that would take a much larger sample size to detect reliably-then the probability of concurrence may not be exactly equal to 1/2, but it will be only slightly higher. For a null hypothesis that is only approximately true, the probability of concurrence might be, say, .51, and this value is much smaller than the values provided by Killeen's p rep .
The second counter-argument is that the Bayes factor implements an automatic Ockam's razor that obeys the principle of parsimony (Myung & Pitt, 1997) . This means that the Bayes factor will prefer the model, of the two, that has the smallest one-step-ahead prediction error to unseen data from the same source (e.g., Dawid, 1984; Wagenmakers, Grünwald, & Steyvers, 2006) . In other words, the Bayes factor prefers the model, of the two, that generalizes best. This predictive interpretation of the Bayes factor "does not depend on viewing one of the models as "true". (...) Thus the Bayes factor can be viewed as measuring the relative success of H 1 and H 0 at predicting the data." (Kass & Raftery, 1995, p. 777) .
The third counter-argument to the claim that the null hypothesis is never true is that theories and models often predict the complete absence of an effect (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, in press) . A test of these models therefore requires that we take the null hypothesis seriously. In the field of visual word recognition, for instance, the entry-opening theory (Forster, Mohan, & Hector, 2003) predicts that masked priming is absent for items that do not have a lexical representation; another example from that literature concerns the work by Bowers, Vigliocco, and Haan (1998) , who have argued that priming effects are equally large for words that look the same in lower and upper case (e.g., kiss/KISS) or that look different (e.g., edge/EDGE), a finding supportive of the hypothesis that priming depends on abstract letter identities. A final example comes from the field of recognition memory, where "context noise" theories (e.g., Dennis & Humphreys, 2001 ), unlike rival "item noise" theories (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984) , predict the absence of a list-length effect. Empirically, this means context noise models predict no change in recognition performance for study lists of different lengths, and so their predictions are exactly those of the null hypothesis (Dennis, Lee, & Kinnell, 2008) .
The above models do not predict that the experimental effects will be small; they predict them to be altogether absent. In fact, for theoretical purposes it often does not matter how large an effect is, as long as it is reliably detected. For instance, if priming effects were larger for words that look the same in lower and upper case (e.g., kiss/KISS) than for those that look different (e.g., edge/EDGE), this would undermine the hypothesis that letters are represented abstractly, no matter whether the effect size was 100 ms or 10 ms. Of course, it is much more difficult for a 10 ms effect to gain credence in the field, but this issue is orthogonal to the argument. Should the 10 ms effect be found repeatedly in different labs across the world, the effect would at some point be deemed reliable and considered strong evidence against any theoretical account that predicted its absence.
Finally, we believe that the philosophy that motivated the introduction of p rep is consistent not with parameter estimation-in which the focus is generally on a single modelbut rather with model selection: "(...) it is rare for psychologists to need estimates of parameters; we are more typically interested in whether a causal relation exists between independent and dependent variables (...). Are women attracted more to men with symmetric faces than to men with asymmetric faces? Does variation in irrelevant dimensions of stimuli affect judgments on relevant dimensions? Does review of traumatic events facilitate recovery?" (Killeen, 2005a, p. 345) When we are interested in the question of "whether a causal relation exists between independent and dependent variables", we need to give special consideration to the possibility that such a relation is absent. Or, in the words of Jeffreys, "Any significance test whatever involves the recognition that there is something special about the value 0, implying that the simple law [the null hypothesis H 0 ] may possibly be true" (Jeffreys, 1961, p. 394) . Thus, one may certainly argue that the null hypothesis is always false, so that p Bma rep reduces to p rep ; but by doing so, one can no longer assess "whether a causal relation exists between independent and dependent variables", as the analysis would implicitly assume that such a relation is present.
In sum, we believe that the null hypothesis is not always false, and-perhaps more convincingly-our analysis does not critically depend on the absolute truth of H 0 . Quantitatively and qualitatively similar results are obtained when we assume that H 0 is represented by a small distribution of effect sizes centered on zero (e.g., Appendix B; see also Berger & Delampady, 1987, pp. 321-322) .
Objection 2: What About Those Priors?
Our analysis is Bayesian, and therefore involves priors, both on the level of models and on the level of parameters. For instance, we have discussed the effects of prior plausibility for H 0 and H 1 on the estimation of the probability of concurrence. Some researchers feel that priors are unknowable or at least subjective, and therefore have no place in scientific reasoning. When one dismisses the concept of priors, one dismisses the entire Bayesian approach, and, so it seems, our entire line of argumentation.
This objection is vulnerable to several counter-arguments. First, the fact that one is unable or unwilling to calculate a quantity does not mean that quantity is irrelevant and can be safely ignored. For instance, we may not know Pr(H 1 ), but the knowledge that it influences the probability of concurrence remains valuable. Second, as was outlined previously, the derivation of p rep is Bayesian, and Killeen argued in fact that the crucial difference between p rep and the p-value is that only the former is "a valid posterior predictive probability" (Killeen, 2005b (Killeen, , p. 1011 . Third, we agree with Jim Berger, who argued that "(...) when different reasonable priors yield substantially different answers, can it be right to state that there is a single answer? Would it not be better to admit that there is scientific uncertainty, with the conclusion depending on prior beliefs?" (Berger, 1985, p. 125) . Finally, the effect of priors can be formally assessed through robustness analysis (e.g., Berger, 1990) .
More concretely, consider the priors involved in our analysis. The first prior is on the level of models, that is, Pr(H 0 ) and its complement, Pr(H 1 ). Equation 3 and Figure 2 highlight how these model priors impact on the probability of concurrence. Of course, the choice of a model prior may be highly subjective; a researcher who wants to demonstrate support for H 0 could assign it a relatively high prior probability, say Pr(H 0 ) = .9. Similarly, a researcher who wants to demonstrate support for H 1 could bias the analysis in its favor by assigning H 1 a relatively high prior probability. A highly biased researcher would even go as far as to assign H 1 all prior probability: Pr(H 1 ) = 1 and Pr(H 0 ) = 0, which in fact yields the p rep measure that is currently standard. In Bayesian model selection, one often avoids such a priori biases by equating the prior model probabilities, such that Pr(H 1 ) = Pr(H 0 ) = 1/2. These uninformative model priors seem appropriate in the absence of strong prior knowledge, because they "provide the level playing field necessary for unbiased evaluation." (Killeen, 2005b (Killeen, , p. 1011 .
The second prior is on the level of parameters. Specifically, the standard calculation of p rep assumes a uniform prior on effect size, that is, a normal prior N (0, τ 2 ) with τ → ∞. This prior is "improper" and is guaranteed to reduce the posterior model weight for H 1 to zero, regardless of what the data show (i.e., Pr(H 1 |D) → 0 as τ → ∞, e.g., Kass & Raftery, 1995) -hence our reliance on the Smith and Spiegelhalter Z-test (i.e., Equation 6 ). One alternative is to use prior knowledge to fix τ to a reasonable number. For instance, based on a review of 474 research literatures in social psychology (Richard, Bond, & StokesZoota, 2003) , Killeen (2007) reported that the distribution of effect sizes was approximately Normal with variance 0.3. Denoting the hypothesis for which τ ∞ by H 1 , one might specify
.3, and calculate both the probability of concurrence and the model weights from a N (0, 0.3) prior on effect size.
Another attractive alternative is to carry out a robustness analysis 5 ; this means that one computes p Bma rep for many different values of τ , every time using the N (0, τ 2 ) prior to calculate both the probability of concurrence and the model weights. That is, we consider two models, H 0 : δ = 0 and H 1 (τ ) : δ ∼ N (0, τ 2 ), and use Equation 3 to calculate p Bma rep (τ ) for many values of τ . Interest may then center, for example, on the maximum value for p Bma rep (τ ) that can be attained by varying τ . We carried out such an analysis and confirmed that even the maximum value of p Bma rep (τ ) is substantially lower than p rep . For instance, our earlier numerical example referred to a hypothetical experiment that yields d = 0.56 with n = 25, resulting in Z = 1.98. For these data, the traditional p rep equals .919. In sharp contrast, a robustness analysis revealed that the upper bound on p Bma rep (τ ) is .764. This upper bound was obtained by varying the prior on effect size (i.e., τ in δ ∼ N (0, τ 2 )), and therefore does not depend on the possibly subjective choice for any specific parameter prior. The only prior that influences this result is the uninformative model prior that deems both H 0 and H 1 equally likely a priori. Consistent with our analysis using the Spiegelhalter and Smith Z-test, the robustness analysis supports our claim that p rep overestimates the probability of concurrence.
General Discussion
In this article, we have shown that Killeen's p rep statistic overestimates the probability of finding a concurrent result in a replicate experiment. The reason for the exaggeration is that p rep assumes that the null hypothesis-under which the probability of concurrence is 1/2-can be ignored. We introduced a Bayesian model averaging procedure to show how the presence of a plausible null hypothesis tempers the enthusiasm stemming from Killeen's p rep . When the data do not decisively rule out the null hypothesis, or when the null hypothesis is a priori much more likely than the alternative hypothesis (Macdonald, 2005) , the probability of concurrence can be considerably lower than is advertised by p rep . Some of our Bayesian reasoning can also be brought to bear against the traditional pvalue. A p-value indicates the probability of encountering a test statistic at least as extreme as the one that was observed in the experiment, given that the null hypothesis is true. This means that a p-value refers to the probability of data given the null hypothesis, and does not refer to the probability of the null hypothesis given data. When researchers study unlikely, counterintuitive phenomena (such as those commonly reported in high-impact psychology journals), the statistical result "p = .04" does not warrant the conclusion that "the null hypothesis can be rejected". When one studies ESP, for instance, it takes more than p = .04 to reject the null hypothesis. From a Bayesian perspective, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. It is important to note, however, that our argument against p rep holds whenever H 0 is assigned any prior mass, and becomes more compelling as Pr(H 0 ) → Pr(H 1 ), leading to the uninformative model prior that provides "the level playing field necessary for unbiased evaluation." (Killeen, 2005b (Killeen, , p. 1011 . The extent to which p rep overestimates the probability of concurrence when Pr(H 0 ) = Pr(H 1 ) can be seen by comparing Prep(K) to Prep(B1) in Figure 2 .
Although it may be argued that our analysis is restricted to the framework of Bayesian inference, this does not diminish its relevance for the evaluation of p rep . Doros and Geier (2005) have argued that p rep is exclusively a Bayesian concept, and p rep should therefore be susceptible to Bayesian arguments. Also, Equation 3, Appendix B, and our robustness analysis indicate that our general conclusion (i.e., p rep overestimates the probability of concurrence) holds across all model priors and across a large class of parameter priors. It is possible to construct a parameter prior under which our general conclusion does not hold; such a parameter prior would be asymmetrical around zero, and assign a lot of mass to values greater or smaller than zero. In the absence of strong prior knowledge, we do not feel such priors are appropriate for Bayesian hypothesis testing, a sentiment that is echoed by the absence of such priors in the Bayesian literature.
Practical Implications
Consider again the hypothetical situation in which you conduct an experiment to test whether words such as pizza prime words such as coin (i.e., perceptual priming, Pecher et al., 1998) . Recall that the experimental effect yields p rep ≈ .94. What should we make of this value? We hazard to guess that researchers, reviewers, and editors are likely to (mis)interpret p rep ≈ .94 as follows: "If this experiment were to be repeated, there is a 94% chance to again observe a reliable perceptual priming effect. This is strong evidence for the presence of perceptual priming in the original experiment."
Unfortunately, this interpretation is as tempting as it is wrong. First, "replication" does not refer to finding again a result that is reliable or statistically significant; in the context of p rep , "replication" refers to concurrence, that is, finding again a result of the same sign, however small and insignificant. This means that the lowest possible value for p rep is already as high as 0.5. It is debatable whether researchers are interested in the probability of concurrence rather than the probability of replication in the traditional sense (i.e, the probability of a replication experiment again yielding a significant result). Another problem with "concurrence" is that it is a definition of replication that is difficult to gauge; how impressive is it that the probability of concurrence is .85, .95, or .99?
Second, our work here shows that p rep is a valid estimate of concurrence only when the null hypothesis can be completely ruled out and when the alternative hypothesis holds that all effect sizes are equally likely a priori. Together, this means that p rep does not estimate the probability of concurrence, but that it estimates an upper bound for this probability, a bound that holds only under strict and arguably unrealistic assumptions. Thus, the correct interpretation of p rep ≈ .94 is "the chance of a concurrent result in a replication experiment is likely to be lower than .94". Although this statement is correct, it does not appear to provide much insight.
In general, we believe that widespread adoption of p rep can all too easily mislead researchers into thinking that their effects are more reliable than they really are. In a field such as psychology, where there is pressure to publish and replication research is relatively rare (Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1993) 
The Future of Statistical Inference in Psychology
For many decades, researchers have pointed out the many shortcomings of p-value hypothesis testing (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963; Wagenmakers, 2007) . The p rep statistic was developed to address some of these shortcomings, but, unfortunately, it is sensitive to some shortcomings of its own. This raises the question of whether there is a single method for statistical inference method that has no shortcomings at all. The answer, alas, appears to be in the negative. Hypothesis testing is very difficult. Nickerson (2000, p. 290) summarized the situation as follows: "NHST [Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing-IWL] surely has warts, but so do all the alternatives". A pragmatic solution would be to use more than just a single method for inference, and demonstrate that the conclusions hold regardless of the particular method that is used.
What are the alternatives to p-values and p rep ? They include Bayesian procedures (e.g., Hoijtink, Klugkist, & Boelen, 2008; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Klugkist et al., 2005; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2005; Rouder et al., in press; Raftery, 1995; Wagenmakers, 2007) , Bayesianfrequentist compromises (e.g., Berger, 2003; Berger, Boukai, & Wang, 1997; Berger, Brown, & Wolpert, 1994; Good, 1983 ), Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC; e.g., Akaike, 1974; Burnham & Anderson, 2002) , cross-validation (e.g., Browne, 2000; Geisser, 1975; Stone, 1974) , bootstrap methods (e.g., Efron & Tibshirani, 1997) , prequential methods (e.g., Dawid, 1984; and methods based on the principle of Minimum Description Length (MDL; e.g., Grünwald, 2000; Grünwald, Myung, & Pitt, 2005; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002; Rissanen, 2001) . All these methods are methods for model selection, in that the explicit or implicit goal is to compare different models and select the best one (for applications of model selection in the field of psychology see the two special issues in the Journal of Mathematical Psychology: Myung, Forster, & Browne, 2000; Wagenmakers & Waldorp, 2006) . Methods for model selection do not assess the adequacy of H 0 or H 1 in isolation. Rather, the adequacy of H 0 is compared to the adequacy of an alternative model, H 1 , automatically avoiding the negative consequences that arise when the focus is on a single model.
In experimental psychology, model selection procedures are mostly used to adjudicate between nonnested, complicated nonlinear models of human cognition. There is no reason, however, why these procedures could not be applied to run-of-the-mill statistical inference problems involving nested linear models such as ANOVA (Lee & Pope, 2006) . We hope and expect that in the near future, concrete alternatives to p-values (e.g., Bayesian hypothesis tests) will be developed and made available in a way that benefits the majority of exper-imental psychologists. This is an exciting possibility that could change the landscape of statistical inference in psychology in a fundamental way.
In conclusion, we applaud Killeen's effort to have psychological researchers compute a Bayesian quantity to decide whether or not there is a causal relation between independent and dependent variables. Unfortunately, the choice for p rep is beset by serious problems (e.g., Iverson et al., in press a, in press b), one of which is that it can lead to overconfidence and undue optimism. We recommend that researchers do not report p rep but either report a model-averaged version of p rep or report the conclusions from one or more alternative methods of statistical inference.
where means "by definition".
In these terms we have 
So we see that our point does not rely on the assumption that Pr(H 0 ) = 0. To summarize: Under any assumption on ζ, θ subject to ζ < θ and any assumption on the prior probability Pr(M 0 ) it is the case that p Of course what one would really like is a useful lower bound so that one could report that, on the basis of given data, the probability of achieving agreement in a replication as to direction is at least that lower bound. Alas the only general lower bound seems to be 1/2 and that is not very interesting.
